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FREE SPEECH IN THE MILITARY
I. INTRODUCTION
By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier. His relations
to the State and the public are changed. He acquires a new
status .... 1
Gradually breaking a tradition of deference to the military,
federal courts have reviewed the decisions of military tribu-
nals with increasing frequency, if not stringency, over the past
thirty years. An issue that has arisen in various forms, though
it never has been treated comprehensively, is the limited free
speech rights of military personnel. Because the Supreme
Court has addressed the issue piecemeal and because of the
halting development of military law, uncertainty exists over
the extent to which a soldier may speak out on military ques-
tions or on broader public or political issues. Among the fac-
tors found to be pivotal in determining whether the speech
merits protection are the issue addressed by the soldier, his
physical location and whether he is in uniform.
Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, free speech has not
been a major issue in the military; however, another unpopu-
lar war or the return of conscription would be sure to engen-
der renewed debate and litigation. This comment will examine
some of the purposely vague limits placed on military speech
and will analyze whether the limits or the vagueness are justi-
fied in light of military history, "military necessity," and the
Supreme Court's gradual broadening of the concepts of free
speech, fair notice and the free speech rights of public
employees.
II. FROM DEFERENCE TO SCRUTINY - AND BACK
A. Deference
Having established that military laws derive solely from
the Constitution,2 federal courts limited their review of mili-
tary decisions to jurisdictional issues- until the early 1950's.
1. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 152 (1890).
2. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 14 (1866).
3. Levine, The Doctrine of Military Necessity in the Federal Courts, 89 Mm. L.
REv. 3, 4 n.1 (1980).
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The Supreme Court exhibited its deference to the military in
Orloff v. Willoughby4 when it allowed the Army to deny a
commission to a conscripted doctor because the doctor would
not deny having been a member of the Communist Party.
"[T]here must be a wide latitude allowed to those in com-
mand, 15 the Court said, adding, "the judiciary [must] be...
scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters
Burns v. Wilson7 reaffirmed this stance and generally is re-
ferred to as the case that solidified civilian deference to the
military. That deference was capsulized in the statement that
military law "exists separate and apart" from civilian law.8
The Court restricted its supervisory role over the military to
ensuring fairness.9 It did hint at the developing doctrine of
military necessity when it established that "the rights of men
in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet cer-
tain overriding demands of discipline and duty. . .."',,
Many recent decisions that strengthen the military's right
to restrict speech have quoted Justice Black's statement in
Toth v. Quarles that "it is the primary business of armies and
navies to fight ... wars."11 The quotation has been used to
bolster claims of "military necessity" - the argument being
that because the military must concentrate on fighting, it can-
not concern itself with strict protection of free speech. How-
ever, the Toth holding actually limited the Army's power,
prohibiting it from court-martialing soldiers after discharge.12
The Court stressed that the Army should concentrate on
fighting and not on post hoc prosecution. Burns' allusion to
the erosion of military independence was broadened with the
statement that strict deference to the military "would be vio-
lative of the traditions of our government since its
inception."13
4. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
5. Id. at 93.
6. Id. at 94.
7. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
8. Id. at 140.
9. Id. at 140, 144.
10. Id. at 140.
11. 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
12. Id. at 21-22.
13. Id. at 15.
19821
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Two major concepts that underly the discussion of military
free speech are "military necessity" and "service connection."
Military necessity is the concept that the military is a unique
society with unique demands and characteristics - particu-
larly discipline, uniformity and national security - and that
it, therefore, must be allowed to operate by its own rules to
the maximum extent possible. "The military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from
that of the civilian, 1 4 was how the Orloff Court phrased it.
The notion reappears in various forms in nearly all the free
speech cases to justify restraints on free speech that otherwise
would not be allowed.
Service connection is the rule that the military cannot
prosecute service members unless the conduct in question is
service-connected, that is, unless it somehow implicates a mil-
itary interest.15 It should be the concept that limits military
necessity. The problem is that service connection never has
been well defined. This has resulted in a melding of the two
distinct concepts to the point where an assertion of military
necessity - the conclusion that the military is unique - has
been used to establish a service connection and to allow the
military to regulate speech.
B. Scrutiny
Courts routinely found service connections (and therefore
deferred to the military) in cases involving military personnel
until 1969, when the Supreme Court abruptly halted the trend
in O'Callahan v. Parker.'" The Court ruled that Sergeant
O'Callahan's off-duty, off-post, out-of-uniform attempted rape
of a civilian woman while he was on leave in Hawaii should
have been tried by a civilian court.17 "If the case does not
arise 'in the land or naval forces,' then the accused" must be
given a civilian right to indictment and jury trial, 8 the Court
held. It added: "The mere fact that petitioner was at the time
14. Orloff, 345 U.S. at 94.
15. See generally O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 262.
18. Id. (emphasis in original).
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. . . on active duty in the Armed Forces does not automati-
cally" grant jurisdiction to the military.19
O'Callahan seemed clearly to remove a large portion of
traditional military jurisdiction to civilian courts. Yet it iden-
tified service connection only by exclusion, failing to posit a
clear test for establishing it2O and forcing other courts to
struggle to understand its limitations.21 It also was animated,
at least in part, by the Warren Court liberals' distrust of the
military at the height of the Vietnam controversy.22 Within
four years, however, the Court was to dramatically reverse its
course in a case dealing with controversial on-duty speech.
C. Deference Again
Captain Howard Levy, an Army doctor, was convicted of
violating Articles 90,23 13324 and 13425 of the Uniform Code of
19. Id. at 266.
20. Justice.Harlan criticized the majority for failing to delineate the scope of ser-
vice connection, claiming that it left open the possibility of including nonmilitary
conduct in certain circumstances, and that it intimated that whether a defendant was
wearing the uniform could make a difference. Id. at 283-84 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
He said that Congress and the military were entitled to know with certainty the lim-
its of jurisdiction. "Otherwise, the infinite permutations of possibly relevant factors
are bound to create confusion and proliferate litigation" over the question, as Harlan
correctly predicted. Id. at 284.
21. In Relford v. United States Disciplinary Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971),
the Court listed nine factors to balance in testing for a service connection, including
"the security of persons and property" on military bases, the adverse effect of on-base
crime, and a commander's responsibility for maintaining order. Id. at 367-69. How-
ever, Relford was not applied in subsequent cases although Justice Brennan cited it
in his dissent in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 766-67, 768 n.4 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The Relford Court may have presaged the Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733 (1974), change of direction in its statement that O'Callahan should not
be unduly restricted: We are unable to "draw a line between ... a serviceman-defen-
dant's on-duty and off-duty activities." 401 U.S. at 369.
22. Justice Douglas did not hide his displeasure with the military, speaking of the
"dangers lurking in military trials" and asserting that military justice was character-
istically "retributive justice." O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265-66. He said court-martials
were "a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is pre-
served," calling them "singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitu-
tional law." Id. at 265.
23. 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1956) (prohibits disobeying a lawful order).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1956) (prohibits conduct "unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tlemen"; the "general article" for officers).
25. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1956) (the "general article" applicable to all servicemembers
prohibits "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces" and "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces").
1982]
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Military Justice (UCMJ) for refusing to establish a dermatol-
ogy training program for the Special Forces (Green Berets).2 6
He said it violated his sense of medical ethics.17 Levy also en-
couraged black enlisted men not to go to Vietnam and
boasted that he disobeyed orders to set up the training pro-
gram.2 8 While a civilian circuit court overturned Levy's court-
martial conviction on the grounds that Articles 133 and 134
were unconstitutionally vague for lack of fair notice,2 9 the Su-
preme Court reversed, reasoning that Article 134's vagueness
was cured by its historical construction."
The Court returned to the concepts of Burns, seemingly
ignoring O'Callahan, in its statement that "[tihis Court has
long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized
society separate from civilian society."3 1 The Court repeatedly
emphasized that the military's unique status permitted it to
regulate individual free speech with "greater breadth and with
greater flexibility" than otherwise would be allowed. 2 First
amendment rights "must be accorded a good deal less weight
in the military context," the Court concluded.3"
Justice Rehnquist admitted that "there may lurk at the
fringes of the articles, even in the light of their narrowing con-
struction . . . some possibility that conduct which would be
ultimately held to be protected by the First Amendment
could be included within their prohibition," but said the
vagueness was not fatal.3 ' Many courts have sustained Articles
133 and 134 on the grounds that history supplies 'sufficient
specificity to validate them against a claim of insufficient
notice.3 5
26. United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 675 (1968).
27. Id. at 676.
"28. Id. at 674-75.
29. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
30. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (To avert any confusion, the Parker in
O'Callahan and in Levy is the same person: the warden of the federal prison where
each defendant was held. Each sued Parker on habeas corpus petitions to win federal
court review of his case.).
31. Id. at 743. Justice Rehnquist earlier indicated his belief that O'Callahan was
an anomaly, stating in his concurrence in Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665,.692 (1973),
that O'Callahan was "wrongly decided" and should be overruled.
32. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974).
33. Id. at 760.
34. Id. at 760-61.
35. See, e.g., Bethea v. O'Kier, 378 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Kan. 1974); United States v.
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Levy unquestionably marked a return to judicial deference
to military discipline. It has been extended to preserve mili-
tary jurisdiction in cases of off-post drug use,36 off-post dem-
onstrations 7 and on-post gathering of signatures on petitions
to be sent to members of Congress. '
In 1980 companion cases, the Supreme Court held that
discipline and efficiency outweighed any absolute right to cir-
culate petitions on military bases, even though Congress,
through the UCMJ, specifically requires freedom to communi-
cate with members of Congress. 9 In Brown v. Glines40 the
Court upheld an Army post regulation requiring approval to
circulate petitions. The Court implied that it intended to reg-
ulate the circumstances of the speech but not its content.
The decision strengthened the breadth of the "military ne-
cessity" doctrine by reciting the arguments about the military
constituting a special society 41 and by upholding the regula-
tion at issue on the grounds that it was promulgated "in sup-
port of a military goal," as opposed to as an attempt to quash
speech qua speech.42 Justices Stewart and Stevens argued that
the regulation was void on the grounds that it conflicted with
the UCMJ's prohibition against "restrict[ing]" a ser-
vicemember's communication with Congress. 43
Higdon, 2 M.J. 445 (1975); United States v. Sadinsky, 14 C.M.A. 563, 34 C.M.R. 343
(1964); United States v. Frantz, 2 C.M.A. 161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953); United States v.
Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185 (1952).
36. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975). In this case, Army Cpt Coun-
cilman was convicted under Art. 134 for an off-post, out-of-uniform, off-duty sale of
marijuana. The Court said that the determination of a service connection turned "in
major part on gauging the impact of an offense on military discipline and effective-
ness." Id. at 760.
37. Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force, 559 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
38. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S.
453 (1980).
39. 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1970) reads: "No person may restrict any member of an
armed force in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the communication
is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of the United States."
This right was reaffirmed in United States v. Schmidt, 10 C.M.A. 57, 36 C.M.R. 213
(1966).
40. 444 U.S. at 351. The Court said: "Air Force regulations specifically prevent
commanders from halting the distribution of materials that merely criticize the Gov-
ernment or its policies." Id. at 355.
41. Id. at 354.
42. Id. at 354-55.
43. Id. at 374 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 378-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1982]
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The futility of fighting such regulations may have been il-
lustrated by Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, where one of
Huff's three petitions was approved for distribution." Huff
was convicted for circulating the others, the Court holding
that Congress did not intend to allow unrestricted circulation
of petitions on military bases.45
II. REGULATING SPEECH IN CONTEXT
Because O'Callahan has not been overruled explicitly, the
military must still establish a service connection when it regu-
lates speech; however, given the broad acceptance of military
necessity in Levy and its application in the relatively narrow
circumstances of Glines and Huff, the test has become easier
for the military to pass. Still, unless the Court allows the mili-
tary simply to claim jurisdiction on all speech questions as it
recently did on drug offenses,4" the context of the speech
should determine whether the military properly may regulate
it. Following are some of the contexts in which the military
has attempted to regulate speech.
A. Internally-Directed Speech About Military Matters
The military has expressed its intention to "safeguard the
servicemember's right of expression to the maximum extent
possible '47 but not to allow it "to proceed unchecked, [if that]
would destroy the effectiveness of his unit. '48 In companion
Vietnam-era cases, two Black Muslim servicemen were con-
victed of disloyalty, based on informal discussions in which
44. 444 U.S. at 454. Despite concern the military has shown for its image overseas
(see, e.g., Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force, 559 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), the
commander approved for on-post distribution a petition critical of the host South
Korean government while forbidding circulation of a copy of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and first amendment which were annotated with criticisms of the base
leadership.
45. Id. at 458.
46. After many strained efforts to find a service connection when none was appar-
ent (for example, because "criminal intent was -formed on base," United States v.
Smith, 2 M.J. 1235 (1976), af'd, 3 M.J. 301 (1977). Accord, e.g., United States v.
Gash, 2 M.J. 707 (1976)), the Court of Military Appeals simply declared that the drug
problem was so severe and so related to military performance that it had jurisdiction
in virtually all drug-related cases involving servicemembers. United States v. Trottier,
9 M.J. 337 (1980).
47. DOD Cir. 632-1, 3 (1974).
48. DOD Cir. 1325.6, 1, para. 11 (1969).
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they urged other soldiers to consider not going to Vietnam but
to stay at home to fight the "black man's war.' 49 While the
court in United States v. Daniels recognized that the state-
ments were made while troops were training for Vietnam, 0 in
United States v. Harvey it said that a soldier must both in-
tend disloyalty and make truly disloyal statements to be
found guilty of disloyalty.5 1 Daniels' conviction was over-
turned because of an instructional error 52 but Harvey's was
reversed because no proof was offered that the statements
themselves were disloyal to the United States itself, as op-
posed to a branch of the service."
Clearly the military's interest in regulating speech directed
only at other servicemembers has a different set of justifica-
tions from its restrictions on speech by military personnel di-
rected to the general public. The threshold of military neces-
sity logically seems lowest with regard to internally-directed
speech; the content obviously is service-connected, so the mili-
tary burden is to show why the speech in question should be
quashed. Despite the reversals in Daniels and Harvey, the
military's interest in regulating that speech (especially inflam-
matory speech such as theirs) is plausible, because the mili-
tary ought to be able to regulate out-and-out fomenting of
disobedience.
Levy, of course, concerned speech that was directed toward
other servicemembers with the express purpose of disrupting
military operations (keeping soldiers out of Vietnam), but the
prosecution seemed to concentrate more on Levy's arrogance
and unconventional demeanor, and less on the inflammatory
potential of his speech and defiance of orders." Levy's behav-
ior was unusual and perhaps disruptive but hardly a reason to
49. United States v. Daniels, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970); United States v. Harvey, 42
C.M.R. 141 (1970).
50. 42 C.M.R. at 137.
51. 42 C.M.R. at 146.
52. Daniels, 42 C.M.R. at 139-40.
53. Harvey, 42 C.M.R. at 146. Harvey relied on United States v. Gray, 41 C.M.R.
756 (1969), rev'd, 20 C.M.A. 63, 42 C.M.R. 255 (1970), which one year earlier had set
out the distinction that a statement must be proved to be disloyal to the United
States, not merely to one of the services.
54. The court said it was unimportant that Levy "may have lacked some of the
accepted but less significant attributes normally expected and required of every of-
ficer." United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 682 (1968).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
quash his speech. Recently, military personnel were forbidden
to "comment on any aspect of the Falkland Islands conflict, ' 55
an apparent broadening of the policy against comment on mil-
itary matters, given that the United States was not militarily
involved in the conflict between Argentina and Great Britain.
B. On-Base Speech
Glines and Huff also involved speech on military installa-
tions, but differed from Harvey and Daniels in that the peti-
tions were to be directed to nonmilitary sources. In Glines the
Court said the military was regulating only the circumstance
of the speech, but in Huff it is reasonable to assume that the
petitions were regulated on the basis of their content because
some were denied while others were approved, meaning that
factors other than mere time and place likely entered the
mind of the regulator.5 6 Although Huff's petitions regarding
military matters could be characterized as internally-directed
speech because they were initially directed toward other ser-
vicemembers (the only way to gather signatures), it can be ar-
gued that the base commander eviscerated their UCMJ-pro-
tected right to communicate with Congress because the
petitions were intended to be sent to members of Congress.57
However, the Court found that the UCMJ provision was only
intended to gear the right of a servicemember to correspond
privately with a member of Congress without command inter-
ference - not "to authorize the unrestricted circulation of pe-
titions within a military base."58
The question remains, however, whether the regulations
vest too much discretion in base commanders by allowing
them to frustrate speech that is ultimately protected by Con-
gress. The Court did not address itself to any question of
abuse of discretion by the commander, despite the record's
lack of articulated reasons for allowing circulation of the peti-
tion criticizing the government of South Korea while denying
permission to circulate copies of petitions regarding military
55. Weekly Bulletin No. 6, Headquarters, 4th Brigade (AR OSUT) (June 4, 1982).
56. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 350 (1980); Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444
U.S. 453, 454 (1980).
57. Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453, 454 (1980).
58. Id. at 458.
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labor disputes and amnesty for draft resisters. 9 It merely said
that it would "not limit a commander's authority more than
the legislative purpose requires."60
The Defense Department forbids "all on-post demonstra-
tions" unless previously approved.61 While this directive is
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding that the time
and place, but not the content, of speech reasonably may be
regulated,62 it was employed in Glines to frustrate circulation
of a petition which fell under the communication with Con-
gress privilege of the UCMJ.6 s It must be assumed that
Glines' petition would have been approved for circulation, had
he submitted it. However, if the phrase "no person" in Article
34 were interpreted in the absolute way Justices Black and
Douglas interpreted the phrase "Congress shall make no law"
in the first amendment, the petition should have been allowed
without prior approval. Regardless, the refusal of Huff's com-
mander to allow two of the three petitions to circulate was
hardly based on the clear and present danger of the messages
(annotated versions of the Declaration of Independence and
first amendment), if the facts are as relayed by a trial court
sympathetic to the military's position. The commander must
not have made the decision based on the content of the
petitions.
The Court of Military Review has held that there must be
a certain amount of "breathing room" for speech by military
personnel. For example, a servicemember who told his com-
mander that he would issue a press release if the commander
kept pressuring him not to complain to his congressman about
food and living conditions was found not guilty of "wrongful
communication of a threat."'" The court said the man should
be free to speak "without being subject to adjudication as a
59. Id. at 454.
60. Id. at 458.
61. DOD Cir. 632-1 (1974).
62. Time, place and manner of speech may be regulated if the regulation focuses
on the circumstances and not the content of the expression. See, e.g., Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558-60 (1948).
63. See supra note 39.
64. United States v. Schmidt, 16 C.M.A. 57, 61, 36 C.M.R. 213, 217 (1966) (Fergu-
son, J., concurring).
1982]
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blackmailer. '65 No doubt the court was aware of the relative
harmlessness of a press release complaining about military
food, yet the decision also reinforced the right of unfettered
communications with Congress.
C. Off-Post Criticism of Military Policy and Operations
While it would seem that the military's interest in an indi-
vidual drops significantly when he is off-post and off-duty,
courts have sustained the prosecution of servicemembers who
have criticized the military in the civilian arena. The most cel-
ebrated case involved Henry Howe, an Army second lieuten-
ant who was court-martialed for marching in an anti-war
demonstration in El Paso, Texas while he was stationed at
nearby Fort Bliss. Though clearly not marching in his official
capacity (he was off-duty and wore civilian clothes), he was
found to have used contemptuous words against the President
and to have engaged in "conduct unbecoming an officer." 6
From the arguments by military lawyers, it appears that
Howe was taken to task because of the language on his signs, 7
which received extensive media coverage.6 s The Court said
that Article 133 outweighed Howe's right to demonstrate,
even though his conduct was unofficial.6 9 Howe was chided for
seeking the "outer limits" of the right to demonstrate; the
court's jury instructions allowed the jury to find his words
contemptuous "because of the connection in which they were
used and the surrounding circumstances. '70
Although the crude language on the college-educated
Howe's signs was at least intemperate, Professor Edward
Sherman points out that the Supreme Court always has pro-
65. Id.
66. 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1970) (prohibits officers from using contemptuous words
against the President and several other officials); 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970) (prohibits
conduct unbecoming an officer).
67. United States v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 169, 37 C.M.R. 429, 432, aff'd, 37
C.M.R. 555 (1967). The signs read: "Let's Have More Than A 'Choice' Between Petty
Ignorant, Facists [sic] in 1968" and "End Johnson's Facist [sic] Agression [sic] in
Viet Nam." Id.
68. Id. at 168-69, 37 C.M.R. at 432-33. There is no evidence that Howe was ever
identified by the public or in news reports as an Army lieutenant.
69. Id. at 178, 37 C.M.R. at 441.
70. 37 C.M.R. at 561. Among the circumstances the court cited was a sign that
read "Peace in Viet Nam." Id. at 560.
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tected "political hyperbole. 1M  The Howe case provides inade-
quate guidance to military personnel considering participation
in off-post, off-duty demonstrations because it is not clear
whether it was the topic of Vietnam, the fact of a public
march, or Howe's signs themselves that were the basis of the
decision.72
Unlike Howe, United States v. Gray involved a United
States Marine who exploited, or at least allowed others to ex-
ploit, his military status when he went absent without leave
and attended several days of heavily publicized anti-war
meetings and demonstrations at a school in Hawaii.7 3 Gray's
conviction for making disloyal statements was reversed be-
cause he was found not to have intended disloyalty to the gov-
ernment, as opposed to the Army; however, the court indi-
cated that he could well have been convicted of an Article 134
violation, even though his speech was thought unlikely to have
had a damaging effect.7 4
While there have been instances in which those with more
of a "pro-military" attitude have been prosecuted for their ex-
ternal communications, 5 the courts' emphases in Howe and
Gray on the context of the demonstrations and their choice of
topics seems to exceed the standards for establishing a mili-
tary interest in regulating them. The military regulation re-
garding off-post demonstrations could have prohibited Howe's
or Gray's participation only if the military had been able to
show that the men were breaking the law or that violence was
71. Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22
HASTINGS L.J. 325, 340 (1971, citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
72. The court said the march could "hardly be characterized as a debate or dis-
cussion" when signs such as "Let's Get Our Boys out of Viet Nam" and "Peace in
Viet Nam" were being carried. 37 C.M.R. at 560.
73. United States v. Gray, 41 C.M.R. 756 (1969), rev'd, 20 C.M.A. 63, 42 C.LR.
255 (1970). The lower court three times referred to media coverage of Gray's stay on
campus, 41 C.M.R. at 758-60, and stressed the exploitation of Gray's and a fellow
marine's service connection, noting that the protesters changed the words of "He's
Got the Whole World in His Hands" to "We've Got Two Ex-Marines in Our Hands"
upon their arrival.
74. Gray, 20 C.M.A. 63, -, 42 C.M.R. 255, 260 (1970). Because he was an en-
listed man, Gray could not have been charged under Art. 88 or Art. 133 under which
Howe, an officer, was charged.
75. A navy lieutenant (j.g.), who criticized President Truman and Secretary of
State "'Red Dean' Acheson, their 'pro-Soviet one-world administration' and their
soft policy towards Red China" in a letter to a lobbyist, was discharged on an Art. 88.
Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces, 57 CoLUM. L. Rxv. 186, 211 (1957).
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likely. 7  The question left unanswered is whether the general
articles can be used to supersede the express working of either
Defense Department regulations or broader constitutional
prohibitions against regulating speech.
D. Speech While in Uniform
When a servicemember wears a uniform in public, it seems
a reasonable conclusion that the person is on duty, performing
military tasks. When a servicemember wears a uniform in
public at political gatherings, a conflict arises: is the ser-
vicemember speaking as a representative of the military, or
stepping outside of the uniform to make an independent
statement? Concern about such a conflict probably motivated
the services' ban on wearing the uniform in public, yet some
contend that wearing the uniform is a form of constitutionally
protected speech.
Army regulations counsel avoiding "conflict between pri-
vate interests and official duties;"' 7" yet in Locks v. Laird,
Locks argued that wearing the uniform at an anti-war demon-
stration contrary to Air Force regulations78 was symbolic
speech and therefore constitutionally protected.7 9 While the
express rationale in the regulations, bolstered by commenta-
tors, has emphasized the inherent ambiguity of a military uni-
form at a public meeting,80 the Locks court indicated that a
uniform could be worn to meetings which the Air Force ap-
76. According to DOD Cir. 632-1 (1974): "AR 600-20 prohibits members of the
Army from participating in off-post demonstrations when they are in uniform, or on
duty, or in a foreign country, or when their activities constitute a breach of law and
order, or when violence is likely to result."
77. AR 600-50 (1-1).
78. 300 F. Supp. 915, 916 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd on other grounds, 441 F.2d 479
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Bright v. Laird, 404 U.S. 986 (1971). Air Force
Reg. 35-10 prohibited wearing of the uniform at any public meeting, demonstration or
interview "if they have reason to know that a purpose... is the advocacy, expression
or approval of opposition to . . . the Armed Forces of the United States."
79. Locks, 300 F. Supp. at 919.
80. "For many,. . . an officer's words have a peculiar aura of responsibility and
officiality," argued Vagts in the Columbia Law Review. See Vagts, supra note 75, at
189. To what extent that remains true today can be debated; what remains clear is
that the officer's "aura of responsibility and officiality" is enhanced when the officer
speaks while in uniform. Even if an audience otherwise knows that the speaker is an
officer (for example, in a small community), it can respect the officer for that but will
not have to determine whether the officer is speaking for the military when dressed in
civilian clothes.
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proved,"' thereby undercutting the stronger position that a
uniform at any meeting sends mixed signals that the public
should not be required to sort out. The court said:
Were we at peace ... [it] might cause us to seriously ques-
tion the constitutionality of the regulation .... But at a
time of national emergency... attendance in uniform at a
demonstration clearly and directly aimed against the very
purposes for which our Armed Forces are to be employed
and used runs counter to the oath each petitioner took...
[and] cannot help but have some adverse and detrimental
effect .... "I
The court indicated that uniforms were acceptable at noncon-
troversial or military-approved gatherings, but not where their
presence might be interpreted as contrary to the Air Force's
purpose or policy. This becomes a blatantly content-based
regulation which permits speech by those supporting official
Air Force policy and quashes dissension. While such restric-
tions may be justified in war time or on sensitive issues, there
are no restrictions in the court's rationale that would keep it
from being employed as a broader pretext to regulating disa-
greeable or controversial speech. As with the Howe scenario,
followers of Locks were left unsure of when they would be vio-
lating a regulation.
The Supreme Court has upheld "symbolic speech" in pro-
tecting the right of public school children to wear black arm-
bands as a war protest,83 but in his dissent in 'that case, Jus-
tice Black may have identified the military's countervailing
interest in limiting such speech. He said the question in the
armband case was "whether students and teachers may use
the schools at their whim as a platform for the exercise of free
speech - 'symbolic' or 'pure."'" Similarly, the military has
an interest in not allowing its unique symbols to be used in
ways that the grantor of the symbols does not intend. To
avoid that, wearing of the uniform should not be permitted at
81. 300 F. Supp. at 918.
82. Id. at 919 (emphasis in original).
83. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
84. Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting). Black emphasized that four of the seven stu-
dents who wore armbands (in a school district of 18,000 children) were the children of
the minister who brought the suit, strongly implying that he was using the opportu-
nity for his own ends. Id. at 516.
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any public functions. Such an evenly applied ban would avoid
punishing people like Locks because of the content of their
speech.
E. Military Speech Overseas
A circumstance different from the others is speech by
American military personnel on foreign soil. It has two main
components: speech in a combat zone and speech by military
personnel based overseas during peacetime.
In denying permission to circulate an anti-war petition in
Vietnam, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the mili-
tary's interest in regulating speech was greatest in a combat
zone."5 In a situation comparable only in that it also involved
a soldier overseas, the same court upheld an absolute ban on
demonstrations by military personnel in foreign countries,
even during times of peace. In the case of Air Force Captain
Thomas Culver, who passed out leaflets and participated in a
presentation of petitions at the American Embassy in London,
all while off-duty, off-post, in civilian clothes and obeying
British law,8 the court held that there was enough military
necessity to justify a ban on all demonstrations by American
military personnel on foreign soil87
Secretary of the Navy v. Huff also involved speech in a
foreign country 8 Yet, even though the petition approved for
circulation was critical of the host South Korean government,
the Court did not address the issue of military speech in for-
eign countries. This may have been because it was on a mili-
tary base, a separate factor that has been found to attach a
high degree of military necessity.
F. Printed Speech
The military commonly has allowed soldiers to possess a
wide range of reading material and to print their own newspa-
pers so long as the work on the publications was done on their
own time and at their own expense.8 9 Some restrictions have
85. Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
86. Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force, 559 F.2d 622, 624-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
87. Id. at 628.
88. 444 U.S. 453 (1980).
89. DOD Cir. 1325.6 (1969), permits "publication of 'underground newspapers' by
military personnel, off-post, on their own time and with their own money and equip-
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been applied, though. Few editors of underground military
newspapers have been convicted, despite the rather salty con-
tent of some of the publications. In United States v. Priest, a
seaman was convicted because articles in which he encouraged
desertion were found to be disloyal within the Gray and Har-
vey disloyalty tests.90 While the dissent argued that there
were no "lucid guideposts" for Priest to follow91 and a mili-
tary critic said such editors are susceptible to selective prose-
cution,92 the dearth of prosecutions and the plethora of such
publications seem to indicate that they are not a matter of
much official concern.
Writing for the civilian press is another matter. In 1964 a
soldier was court-martialed for refusing to delete portions of
his book critical of General Douglas MacArthur, contrary to
an Army regulation that required prepublication clearance. 3
While the author's loyalty was not in question, the regulation
was upheld as a valid prior restraint because "prevention [is]
...imperative" in the military context."' A concurring opin-
ion ignored the particulars of the case but concentrated on the
possible: "A few dissident workers, occupying positions of im-
portance in the military, could undermine the leadership of
the armed forces . . . ."95 It said that if every servicemember
were allowed to criticize the military "during a time of con-
flict, or preparation.., then the war effort would most assur-
edly fail."' 6 Writing letters to the editor in support of political
ment" with the proviso that if the newspaper "contains language the utterance of
which is punishable under Federal law, those involved.., may be disciplined for
such infractions."
90. United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 64, 66, 44 C.M.R. 118, 120 (1971). In his
book in which he generally defended and supported the military system of justice,
Joseph Bishop said it was "hard to see how any rational person could believe in
revolution after reading Priest's articles under headlines such as 'Today's Pigs are
Tomorrow's Bacon."' J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIn 154-55 (1974).
91. Priest, 21 C.M.A. at 68, 44 C.M.R. at 122.
92. Robert Sherrill cited the case of PFC Bruce Petersen who he said was sen-
tenced to eight years confinement for marijuana possession, a sentence made pur-
posely more severe, according to Sherrill, because Petersen also was editor of a news-
paper at Fort Hood, Texas. R. SHERRILL, MLITARY JUSTICE Is TO JUSTICE As MLrrARY
Music Is TO Music 41 (1969).
93. United States v. Voorhees, 4 C.M.A. 509, 518-19, 16 C.M.R. 83, 90 (1964); AR
360-5, para. 9-b.
94. United States v. Voorhees, 4 C.M.A. 509, -, 16 C.M.R. 83, 92 (1964).
95. Id. at 533, 16 C.M.R. at 94 (Latimer, J., concurring).
96. Id.
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candidates is also forbidden but will be discussed below be-
cause it has never been litigated.
G. General Political Speech
A wider question than those presented above is the general
right of military personnel to assert themselves politically.
The question is not one of running for office (sensibly forbid-
den) but of prohibitions against writing letters to the editor,
speaking at public forums, displaying political signs and rais-
ing money for political causes.97 Any activity that resembles
support for a partisan political candidate has been barred. Po-
litically interested servicemembers must consult the checklist
appendix to the political activity regulations or simply not be-
come involved. Examples of the thin distinctions are that a
member may "[j]oin a political club and attend its meetings
when not in uniform" 8 but may not "[s]peak before a parti-
san political gathering of any kind.""" He may "[d]isplay a
bumper sticker,"100 but not "a large political sign, banner or
poster." 10 1
The overall divorce of the military from politics is lauda-
ble, and traces to the beginning of the Republic. Civilian con-
trol of the military was thought important enough to place it
in the Constitution;102 however, the Army has seized upon
that intent to keep its members out of meaningful political
involvement. That members may attend meetings but not
speak, that they may write letters "provided [they] do not at-
tempt to promote a partisan political cause," 10 3 but may not
perform clerical tasks for a political campaign, reduces the
soldier to a mere voter. Servicemembers should argue that
limiting their political speech also limits their right to have
their speech heard. By effectively cutting two million military
men and women out of the political process, the right of other
citizens to hear the political contributions- of a large number
97. AR 600-20, App. A, pp. A-I, A-2.
98. Id. at A-1(c).
99. Id. at A-2(h).
100. Id. at A-10).
101. Id. at A-2(p).
102. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8: Congress has the power to "make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
103. AR 600-20, App. A, A-1(g).
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of citizens is being violated. The mere fact of connection to
the military has not been found to comprise a "compelling in-
terest" for regulating speech, yet the United States Supreme
Court has held that a compelling interest is required to regu-
late fundamental rights such as speech.1 '" As the following
sections will explain, three major sources supply the rationale
for keeping the military out of politics, although not necessa-
rily to the extent the regulations require.
1. Civilian Supremacy
The most compelling and historically based of the argu-
ments is the notion of "civilian supremacy." It stresses the
United States' beginnings as a society dedicated to civilian au-
thority. In a 1962 article, then Chief Justice Earl Warren said
the American tradition of "continued supremacy of [our] civil-
ian representatives" was "not merely happenstance." 10 5 He
said the United States' heritage of civilian control might seem
odd "[tlo strangers . .. since our country was born in war"
but that it was a reaction by people who "had long been sub-
jected to the intemperance of military power."106 It is a princi-
ple that traces to the beginnings of the Republic.' 1
The Army hints that similar reasoning supports its politi-
cal regulations, saying: "Any activity that could be interpreted
as associating the Department of the Army. . . with a parti-
san political cause or candidate must be avoided."' 08 Still, it is
questionable whether the "risk that a military commander
might attempt to 'deliver' his men's votes for a major-party
candidate"10 9 is sufficient constitutional justification for
broadly denying those on active duty the opportunity to par-
ticipate actively in the political process.
104. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
105. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 181, 183
(1962).
106. Id.
107. "Prominent among the grievances stated in the Declaration of Independence,
from Jefferson's first draft to the appearance of the document in its final form, was
that" standing peacetime armies were kept without legislative consent and military
given power independent of the legislature. H. LAsswELL, NATIONAL SECURMTY AND
INDIvIDuAL FREEDOM 58 (1950). Thomas Jefferson feared that: "He [the King] has
affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power." Id.
108. AR 600-20, App. A, A-3.
109. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 841-42 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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2. The "White Horse" Rationale
A reason the Howe court gave for upholding the Article 88
restriction on "contemptuous" speech by officers was that
"the ancient and wise provisions insuring civilian control of
the military will restrict the 'man on the white horse,' "110 pre-
sumably riding on the crest of an illusion of honor and vigi-
lance to conquer an unwitting civilian populace. Perhaps the
fact that the United States has never faced such a threat
makes it as easy to dismiss as it is to claim that the military's
strident internal discipline keeps the white horses at bay. Jo-
seph Bishop doubted "that a pipsqueak shavetail like Howe
was much of a threat" to authority and noted that his was the
first Article 88 prosecution in twenty-five years."'
While this nation has a history of electing war heroes to
the Presidency,112 it never has faced an overt "white horse"
threat. Furthermore, the mere threat of such a scenario is
hardly constitutional justification for limiting freedom of
speech.
3. Discipline (Necessity)
After considering all of the constitutional arguments, sev-
eral courts and commentators have argued that the broad um-
brella of military discipline gives the military the right to reg-
ulate the speech of its members regardless of its context. Just
as with drugs in the Trottier case,11 " the argument for regulat-
ing speech is that regardless of the context, the military's
needs for discipline and readiness are so overriding that it
must retain the right to regulate servicemembers' speech.
Detlev Vagts said that an effective army cannot be run
democratically.11 4 The question, however, is not the military's
undemocratic structure 15 but the flat assertion that military
necessity means that military personnel must speak at their
own risk.
110. United States v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 175, 37 C.M.R. 429, 439, af'd, 37
C.M.R. 555 (1967).
111. J. BISHOP, supra note 90, at 157.
112. War heroes elected to the Presidency include George Washington, Andrew
Jackson, Ulysses S. Grant, Theodore Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower.
113. United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (1980). See supra note 46.
114. Vagts, supra note 75, at 189.
115. 32 C.F.R. § 143 (1981).
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The Howe court said "[t]he ultimate purpose for the exis-
tence of the military establishment is to prepare for ... com-
bat" and "its bedrock is order and discipline."' 11 Vagts said
that an army without an "atmosphere of discipline must de-
generate into a mere armed rabble. 11 7
An Army lawyer has said that the Army cannot fuse "the
liberal democratic tradition and the professional military tra-
dition."118 He argues that the military tradition of discipline
"emphasizes the permanence, irrationality, and weakness of
human nature .... It exalts obedience and subordination of
all personal interests as the highest virtues of military men
.... Fusion of the official and private spheres of its mem-
bers' lives is a basic feature of the tradition."1 19
Clearly, the military feels, like Justice Reed in Toth v.
Quarles, that "[w]ar is a grim business, requiring sacrifice of
ease, opportunity, freedom from restraint, and liberty of ac-
tion."' 20 The question remains whether that restraint applies
as strongly in times of peace and whether military necessity
means that military personnel waive some of the most funda-
mental rights they enjoy as citizens of the United States. In
his Glines dissent, Justice Brennan charged that the military's
true fear was a lack of uniformity in opinion. He warned that,
"[tihe perceived threat to discipline and morale will often cor-
relate with the commanding officer's personal or political
biases."11 21
H. Nonpolitical Speech
When military regulations stress the dangers of political
speech, the implication seems to be that nonpolitical or issue-
oriented speech is permitted, but other language indicates
that it, too, is subject to some broadly defined limits. One
Army regulation cautions against participation in "any ...
116. 37 C.M.R. at 559.
117. Vagts, supra note 75, at 188.
118. Murphy, A Soldier's Right to a Private Life, 24 Mm. L. R~v. 97, 100 (1964).
119. Id. at 101.
120. 350 U.S. 11, 29 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting).
121. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 365 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
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public demonstration [that] may imply Army sanctions of the
cause for which the demonstration is conducted. '122
While the reasoning that prohibits wearing of the uniform
in public would apply generally to setting oneself out as a mil-
itary person (for example, "Hello, I'm Captain Smith and I'm
against nuclear power."), the Army's interest in otherwise reg-
ulating cause-oriented off-duty speech is questionable. The
distinction between political and nonpolitical speech largely
grows out of the military regulations that characterize the ob-
jectionable speech primarily as that directed to a particular
candidate or party - as opposed to public issues such as
abortion, nuclear power or prayer in the schools.
The military is not the only organization to limit the rights
of its members for the sake of appearance,128 but that concern
with appearance should not be allowed to overcome funda-
mental speech rights. One Army lawyer said that such regula-
tions were motivated by "an almost obsessive concern with
public relations. [Some] commanders [are] so absorbed with
the 'image' of the Army created by personnel in their off-duty
activities that they lose sight of the soldier's legitimate urge to
express the peculiarities of his own character. '124 More impor-
tant than providing an outlet for that urge is allowing the
speech on the basis that the soldier's first amendment right of
free expression outweighs a commander's interest in regulat-
ing the speech.
III. VAGUENESS, NOTICE AND THE GENERAL ARTICLES
The fear raised by Justice Brennan in Glines - that a
vaguely worded statute could be employed selectively to
clamp down on conduct at the discretion of the enforcer -
intertwines with the question of whether the soldier whose
speech is being regulated would have reason to believe that
his conduct is prohibited. An underlying question in almost
every case prosecuted under one of the general articles12 5 is
122. AR 600-20, paras. 5-16.
123. See generally CODE oF ETHICS OF THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS
(advises members to refrain from any kind of political involvement); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY (1979) (counsels lawyers against activities that raise
even the appearance of impropriety).
124. See Murphy, supra note 118, at 124.
125. For the text of the general articles, see supra notes 23-25.
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whether the articles sufficiently inform those subject to them
that the conduct for which they are being prosecuted is
prohibited.
Even if the concept of military necessity were accepted to
some degree - that is, even if military personnel should enjoy
a more restricted right of speech than civilians - they are
entitled to know precisely what speech offends regulations.
Notice is a concept fundamental to our system of law.12 On
the other hand, some have argued that not only do military
personnel have limited free speech rights, but also that they
have no right to know those limits in advance. 127
On the general right to notice, the Supreme Court has held
that a statute is void for vagueness, and therefore does not
supply adequate notice, when it "fails to give a person of ordi-
nary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden. '1 28 A major reason to declare a statute void is that
such vagueness "encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictions. '' 129 The Constitution has been held to apply to
the military,1 30 and the Court has held the concept of notice
to be fundamental to the Constitution.13 1 Even while support-
ing a broad military right to regulate its members, Justice
Harlan, dissenting in O'Callahan, also said that ser-
vicemembers must be able to know the proper limits of their
conduct with certainty.13 2
As was seen in the cases of marching in parades or demon-
strations, writing for publications or presenting petitions to
American representatives overseas, the boundaries of conduct
which Articles 133 and 134 set are not clear. In upholding
those articles in Levy, Justice Rehnquist admitted that they
would have been subject to constitutional attack if they had
not been "narrowed" by almost two hundred years of con-
126. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
127. See generally Nelson, Conduct Expected of an Officer and a Gentleman:
Ambiguity, 12 A.F. J.A.G. L. Rlv. 124, 140-41 (1970) for the proposition that the
vagueness of the articles is necessary.
128. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
129. Id. (citation omitted).
130. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 14 (1866).
131. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965).
132. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 284 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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struction.13 3 Many courts have employed the argument that
the articles are narrowed by history,"" although the Third
Circuit held that reliance on such historical construction was
impermissible when the topic was speech.13 5
In his Levy concurrence, Justice Blackmun argued that a
soldier should know automatically what the articles prohibit
because they are based on fundamental concepts of right and
wrong.1 38 Even if, as Justice Blackmun asserts, "times have
not changed in the area of moral precepts,1 37 the general arti-
cles have proven a poor predictor in that regard. Surely, if
they were meant merely to cover right and wrong, they would
not be applied so frequently to political speech, which often
can be ridiculous or extreme but should not be judicially sanc-
tioned as wrong. That servicemembers could be, and com-
monly are, charged with violation of a specific article along
with violation of a general article'3 8 demonstrates the articles'
elasticity. They have been applied to prosecute a wide array
of offenses,3 9 and their breadth and unpredictability could
chill free expression. Soldiers could be forced to tread too
warily in asserting their right of free speech, resulting in their
not asserting it at all. The Court has always held that the time
and place of speech can be reasonably regulated 140 but the
content of speech can be regulated only in the strictest
circumstances.1 41
133. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974). His statement about their historical
construction was probably dictum because Justice Rehnquist held that notice was
unquestionably clear enough to Levy who lacked standing to raise insufficient notice
as an objection. Id. at 754-56.
134. See supra note 35.
135. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 794 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
136. 417 U.S. at 763 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
137. Id.
138. See Nelson, supra note 127, at 131.
139. See Levy v. Parker, 417 U.S. 773, 778-80 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring), in
which Justice Stewart lists crimes ranging from failure to repay debts to cheating
while calling bingo numbers that have been prosecuted under the general articles.
140. See supra note 62.
141. Except for the absolutists, most Justices have agreed that some discrimina-
tions can be made on the basis of the content of speech, which is why there is a much
lower threshold for banning obscenity or "fighting words" (although this concept is
weakening) and why commercial speech sits on a lower plane. See, e.g., Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Regardless, po-
litical speech always has been held to deserve the highest protection, with courts con-
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In another decision favorable to the military, the Court ac-
knowledged "[iut is possible, of course, that... [the articles]
might in the future be applied irrationally, invidiously, or ar-
bitrarily," but said there was no arbitrariness in the instance
it was considering. 142 The Court considered the articles "as
applied," reasoning that it would not make a broad constitu-
tional ruling when in this instance the conduct could be said
to come within the ambit of the articles. However, such a reg-
ulation, particularly when applied to a right as highly pro-
tected as speech, should be considered on its face,' 43 that is,
independent of the context. Even if the cases considered so
far can be said to have provided adequate notice to those in-
volved, the "general articles" remain, as Justice Stewart ar-
gued in Levy, "in practice as well as theory 'catch-alls,'...
[that] allow prosecutions for practically any conduct that may
offend the sensibilities of a military commander. 1 44
There are several disturbing instances in which courts
have upheld military regulations of speech based on no more
than the speculation that failure to restrict the speech before
it was uttered would result in harm. By permitting regulation
in Locks on the grounds that the speech in question might
"have some adverse ... effect,"' 4 5 by deciding in United
States v. Voorhees that a "few dissident[s] .. .could under-
mine the... Armed Forces, 1"4 and by giving great credence
to the "white horse" theory in Howe, courts have upheld regu-
lations of speech by military members on the basis that some
undetermined harm might result. Such liberality flies in the
face of one of the most fundamental constitutional precepts:
there is an overwhelming presumption against prior restraints
on speech.147
sistently ruling that political expression sits at the core of first amendment values.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968). In the famous Carolene Products footnote, Justice Stone held that "a more
exacting judicial scrutiny" is required for restrictions on "political processes." United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
142. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
143. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
144. 417 U.S. at 779 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
145. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
147. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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The problem, of course, is that although constitutional
rights have been held to apply to members of the Armed
Forces, 148 there is a string of cases to support the proposition
that proof of the potential danger of military speech is suffi-
cient to regulate it and that actual harm is not an element. 149
Such findings leave a clear constitutional conflict: whether to
carve out the military as a special group with watered-down
constitutional rights or whether to attempt to apply the full
panoply of constitutional rights except in narrowly defined
circumstances. Perhaps the decision already has been made.
Accepting the need for the military to regulate speech, the
subjects of that regulation must know with certainty what
speech is prohibited before it is uttered.18 0 Prosecutions for
offensive speech have also touched those in favor of increased
military activity.151 Because there is no "common thread or
unifying theme that gives generic definition to the articles," 152
soldiers of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at
their meaning, giving rise to the specter of their selective en-
forcement and the chilling of free speech.
IV. SEEKING A RULE: SOLDIERS AS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
If the military is not to be set out as a wholly separate
148. See United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United
States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
149. Priest, Howe, Daniels and Gray all said that a danger of harm was sufficient;
Locks said that proof of "some" harm was sufficient. Locks v. Laird, 300 F. Supp. 915,
919 (N.D. Cal. 1969), affd on other grounds, 441 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Bright v. Laird, 404 U.S. 986 (1971).
150. Of course, considering this question assumes that the concept of notice ap-
plies to the military. Implicit in the arguments of those such as Justice Rehnquist,
who sustained the articles, is that they supply sufficient notice. Nonetheless, Justice
Blackmun argued that vagueness was a virtue in the military context: "The subtle
airs that govern the command relationship are not always capable of specification."
417 U.S. at 763 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He said they largely prohibited conduct
that is "malum in se." Id. at 764-65. One military author also called their vagueness
useful. He said that if the articles were made specific, the initiative of the modem
officer would be destroyed. See Nelson, supra note 127, at 140.
151. Vagts noted that strong military leaders such as Air Force General Billy
Mitchell (who was ultimately court-martialed) and General George Patton also had
their speech suppressed. See Vagts, supra note 75, at 197. Sherman noted that Gen-
eral Leonard Wood (later to have a fort named in his honor) was allowed to cross the
country, parading the virtues of a military buildup - an example of arbitrary en-
forcement of Arts. 133 and 134 which historically prohibited unauthorized public
comment on military matters. See Sherman, supra note 71, at 345.
152. Levy v. Parker, 417 U.S. 733, 784 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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society with a unique set of rules, it must be brought within
the general rules that govern speech while protecting interests
peculiar to it. While extending most civilian freedoms to mili-
tary personnel would not require scrapping the military court
system, it would require balancing the needs of military disci-
pline and national security against the general constitutional
rights of American citizens, perhaps incorporating concepts
such as notice and requiring a stricter showing of harm.
Military personnel should be viewed legally as the public
employees that they are. Law relating to public employees has
developed rapidly over the past two decades. While they have
been found in well-defined circumstances to have fewer rights
than the general public, especially in the areas of political
speech and campaigning, courts have also construed these lim-
its strictly, balancing the state's interests against general free
speech rights. In Levy, Justice Rehnquist said that the gov-
ernment-to-soldier relationship must be viewed in part as that
of employer to employee.153
Generally, courts have insisted that the government may
not limit the off-duty activities of employees that do not af-
fect their fitness to do their jobs. The Supreme Court has held
that the political activities of employees may be restricted,
1
'
5
but that an employee's letter to the editor critical of his em-
ployer was not grounds for dismissal.155
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court held that
"teachers may [not] constitutionally be compelled to relin-
quish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy
as citizens to comment on matters of public interest .... M56
The Court called for balancing "the interests of the teacher,
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees. '157 The Court required that actual harm be shown,
rejecting the school board's claim that such criticism was per
153. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974).
154. United States Civil Serv. Cornm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973).
155. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
156. Id. at 568.
157. Id.
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se harmful.15 The Court said a failure to show that the letter
"in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance
of his daily duties . . . or. . . interfered with the regular op-
eration of the schools" '159 required ruling in favor of "[t]he
public interest in. . . free and unhindered debate on matters
of public importance, '' l 0 a right it called "the core value of
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment." 61
In United States Civil Service Commission v. National
Association of Letter Carriers, the Court held the Hatch
Act 6 2 valid and made the same distinction that the military
regulations try to make between "active participation in polit-
ical campaigns" (forbidden) and "expressions, public or pri-
vate on public affairs" (permitted).163 The Court said that
participation in politics was not an absolute right" and that
restricting political involvement to that of a spectator 65 was
permissible to preserve the appearance that federal jobs were
won on the basis of merit, not politics.166
While Letter Carriers stands for the proposition that
purely political activity may be regulated because of a strong
governmental interest, Pickering and cases that followed it
make it clear that employee expressions that are not tied to a
specific political campaign must be allowed unless they can be
shown to affect job performance. 167 In at least one case, this
rationale has been applied to the military to reverse a decision
dismissing a reserve drill sergeant merely because she was a
homosexual, 68 but never in military courts or at a higher fed-
158. Id. at 570-71.
159. Id. at 572-73.
160. Id. at 573.
161. Id.
162. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1976), prohibits participation by federal
employees in political campaigns.
163. 413 U.S. 548, 575-76 (1973).
164. Id. at 567. This argument echoes the oft-quoted statement of Judge (later
Justice) Oliver Wendell Holmes that "[a police officer] may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, -, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
165. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 582.
166. Id. at 565.
167. In a 1979 opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court ruled that a
teacher dismissed for her public criticisms of a principal was unjustly fired. Givhan v.
Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979).
168. In benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 969 (E.D. Wis.
1980), the court held that because there was "no showing that her sexual preferences
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eral level.
On the question of political or nonpolitical "issue-related"
speech, the reasoning which upheld the right of a Wisconsin
public school teacher to speak as a private citizen at a school
board meeting could be extended to permit military personnel
to speak at public gatherings when they clearly disassociate
themselves from speaking as official military representatives.
In City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Commission,69 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission could not bar the teacher from addressing it at a
public meeting on pending labor negotiations.170
Decisions that may be even more applicable to the military
are those that involve paramilitary or semimilitary groups
such as police and fire fighters. Although well-drawn bans on
their political activity have been upheld,'7 1 both groups con-
sistently have been allowed publicly to criticize department
operations,' 72 and their right to engage in general political ac-
tivity has been upheld.27 3 When fire fighters were found to
have exploited their positions to win public favor, a regulation
prohibiting members from lending official photographs for ad-
vertisements or personal advancement was upheld. 7 4
These "semimilitary" personnel are the closest parallel to
military personnel. Unlike most soldiers on domestic bases in
time of peace, fire fighters and police are always at a higher
state of "readiness," yet their speech is generally found to be
interfered with her abilities as a soldier or adversely affected other members of the
service," she could not be discharged for her conduct.
169. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
170. Id. at 174-76.
171. See, e.g., Rogenski v. Board of Fire and Police Comm'rs, 6 IlM. App. 3d 604,
285 N.E.2d 230 (1972) in which the court held that a narrowly drawn statute that
limited police participation in partisan political activity could be upheld against a
vagueness challenge.
172. Id. at 610, 285 N.E.2d at 234-35. The court held that the department could
not validly prohibit public criticism of the police department or police officials if it
was not disruptive. Id.
173. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 393-95 (1962) (sheriff who made a public
statement about a political controversy was found to have spoken as a private citizen
and the statement found not to have interfered with his job); De Stefano v. Wilson,
233 A.2d 682 (N.J. 1967) (public employee had the right to virtually the same consti-
tutional protections as an ordinary citizen, including the right to engage in political
activity).
174. Kane v. Walsh, 295 N.Y. 198, 66 N.E.2d 53, 63 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1946).
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as protected as that of other public employees. While the mili-
tary could argue that its troops must always be ready to en-
gage in combat even during routine peacetime training, it is
difficult to fashion an argument that could justify restraining
the free speech rights of such soldiers more than those of fire
fighters and police who daily perform their trained tasks.
V. CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, there are circumstances in which the doc-
trine of military necessity legitimately should be able to limit
otherwise free speech.17 5 The military does have unique re-
quirements - discipline and national security - that warrant
special attention and stricter regulations. 7" Restraints that
make servicemembers subject to court-martial for disobeying
a lawful order 17 7 or spilling secrets to the enemy, 7 8 as well as
the ban on unionization,17 9 are examples of sensible ways in
which rights accorded to civilians are not extended to soldiers.
A rule fundamental to the American system of law, how-
ever, is that no one rule or person or branch of government is
absolutely superior. The closest to a superior right is free
speech and, in particular, political speech, yet despite its pre-
ferred position, 80 it has not been found to be absolute."' Im-
plicit in the assertion of military necessity is that this "need"
supersedes otherwise applicable constitutional rights in all ar-
eas. Obviously, the first amendment stands as a barrier. The
two contending legal forces should be balanced. Until now, in-
175. Surely there are situations in which, as the Glines Court noted, first amend-
ment rights "must yield somewhat 'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty.'" Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (citations omitted). The prob-
lem is that this yielding should be done on an ad hoc basis and not by giving the
military carte blanche to regulate the speech of its members.
176. Reinforced in Glines was the theory that preparedness required "a respect
for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life." Brown v. Glines, 444
U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (citations omitted).
177. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
178. 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970). The specter of a commander bargaining with the
troops on whether to fight illustrates the applicability of the necessity concept here.
179. 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1970).
180. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Court said "[f]reedom of press, freedom of
speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a preferred position." 319 U.S. 105, 115
(1943).
181. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966). Accord Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974).
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cluding the recent Glines and Huff cases, the Court has de-
ferred to the military without even the mildest scrutiny of the
effect of some regulations on constitutional free speech
rights.18 2
When the military can articulate a need to suppress
speech, such as when the soldier is in uniform or in battle
conditions, suppression should be allowed; otherwise, consti-
tutional rights should apply. Under the broad umbrella of ne-
cessity the military has been able to regulate speech nearly at
will. Proof of an accompanying specific harm, for example,
that the speech would impair national security, seriously un-
dermine discipline, or affect a servicemember's job perform-
ance, ought to be part of the required showing. This should
not appreciably undercut command discretion; rather it would
strike the proper balance between the peculiar needs of the
military and the important constitutional rights with which
American citizens are vested. It should mean neither a mili-
tary run awry without discipline, nor a military in which un-
popular but nondangerous speech is suppressed.
Military rights of free speech should be analyzed in the
public employee mode of balancing the employer's interests
(the need to maintain discipline, preserve national security
and other articulated military concerns) against the em-
ployee's interest (the servicemember's constitutional right to
free expression). Flowing from Pickering and benShalom v.
Secretary of the Army is the requirement that a soldier
should be free to exercise a citizen's constitutional rights un-
less such exercise can be found to have a demonstrable impact
on his job performance or on the specific articulated concerns
of national security or discipline.18 O'Callahan sets the ser-
vice connection requirement, and in the area of speech that
connection should be supplied only if the military shows a
job-related impact or an overriding military need in the par-
182. This deference has not been limited to speech cases. In upholding the draft-
ing of men and not women, the Court said that it would defer to Congressional pur-
pose and intent. Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306 (1980).
183. Unlike the cases cited supra at note 152, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 569-71 (1968) required a showing of actual harm as a result of the speech. In
Tinker, the Court said that a fear of disruption or the unpleasantness of speech was
not sufficient grounds to regulate it. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
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ticular instance.
A flaw in the military system that allows a broad, nonspe-
cific concern for "discipline" to quash speech is the broad ap-
plication of the general articles as well as the easy employ-
ment of military necessity to justify use of one of the articles.
The articles are paradigms of vagueness, ripe for surprise
prosecutions and selective application. They should be abol-
ished in favor of narrowly drawn articles that would protect
the military's legitimate interests in discipline and security
while incorporating constitutional concepts such as notice.
Abolition of the general articles is hardly a radical propo-
sal. 1 4 The articles are inconsistent with the command of
Broadrick v. Oklahoma that the government must adopt regu-
lations least intrusive of individual liberties when regulating
first amendment rights.18s Even if, as Justice Blackmun as-
serted, "everyone should know" what the general articles pro-
hibit,"8 " they remain a powerful tool for arbitrary enforce-
ment. Also, given the frequency with which military
defendants are charged with a specific violation and a general
article violation, very few potential infractions would not be
covered if the general articles were abolished and new sections
of the UCMJ drawn up specifically to address military limits
on free speech.
The speech in which the military asserts an overriding reg-
ulatory interest should be inserted as a new provision in the
UCMJ (all changes in the UCMJ require congressional ap-
proval because it is part of the United States Code). In the
absence of new provisions, courts should require the military
to articulate its need to regulate the speech in question; ide-
ally, new provisions of the UCMJ should be written covering
the areas below. In descending order of importance to the mil-
itary, arguments could be made for regulating speech in five
general situations.
184. Proposed by Maj. Gen. Kenneth J. Hodson in The Manual for Courts-Mar-
tial - 1984, 57 ML. L. REv. 1, 12 (1972). Gen. Hodson said: "We don't really need
[Art. 134], and we can't defend our use of it in this modern world. It probably could
not withstand a 'vague and indefinite' attack in the Supreme Court." Id.
185. 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574
(1965) (regulation of speech must not be "so broad in scope as to stifle First Amend-
ment freedoms . . ").
186. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 763 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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A. During Time of War
The need for regulation is greatest in the combat zone, and
no solid argument could be made that a soldier's right to exer-
cise his first amendment freedoms outweighs the military's
mission to win a war. Carlson v. Schlesinger stands as an
example.187
Even outside of the actual war zone achievement of the
military objective should remain the utmost goal, particularly
in training areas and on bases. However, public speech by off-
duty servicemembers in a civilian context should not be pro-
hibited simply because a war is going on elsewhere. Naturally
this would not sanction any breaches of confidential or classi-
fied information and an argument could be made that detailed
discussion of the war zone would be inappropriate. Despite a
commander's desirable quest for unity, neither that nor a fear
that the military mission might be hurt by an appearance of
less than unanimous endorsement of the cause or the tactics
should outweigh a soldier's first amendment rights. Again, a
higher state of readiness on the bases themselves or in the
area where the soldier is speaking could change the situation
and affect the justification for regulating the speech.1 To jus-
tify a sweeping limit simply on the basis that a war is going on
assumes that a veneer of unity outweighs the undercutting of
protected speech without adequate justification. Nonetheless,
the fact of war introduces an important factor to be weighed
in the balance.
B. In Uniform
The military should restrict wearing the uniform at any
kind of public nonmilitary event. Three purposes would be
served. First, the ambiguity of a speaker (or spectator) in uni-
form would be averted. Second, the historical separation of
military influence (not military citizens) would be preserved.
Third, it would be clear that the military qua military does
187. 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See supra text accompanying note 85.
188. What should be avoided is the opportunity for rationale such as that used in
Howe to convict a soldier. The court said: "[H]undreds of thousands of members of
our military forces are committed to combat in Vietnam," showing more their disgust
with Howe's opinion than with any danger stemming from his misspelled signs.
United States v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 173, 37 C.M.R. 429, 437, aff'd, 37 C.M.R. 555
(1967).
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not endorse any causes, and a flat prohibition would make the
military immune to charges that it selectively allows those in
uniform to appear publicly. These three interests outweigh
any right to speak "symbolically" as the Tinker rationale
might assert.18 They also would avoid the senseless kind of
haggling over whether the uniform was sufficiently covered by
plain jackets or whether the commander gave permission to
demonstrate with covered uniforms.
C. Overseas
Even when no war is in progress, Americans in uniform or
on foreign soil are seen as representatives of the government,
and often are easily spotted when not in uniform. Ser-
vicemembers should avoid any public demonstrations in for-
eign countries for general foreign policy reasons as well as mil-
itary reasons. However, soldiers on foreign soil should not be
prevented from communicating with their representatives
overseas as Culver did at the American Embassy in London 90
because the interest to be protected is that of avoiding inad-
vertent misrepresentation of the United States Government,
which cannot monitor the actions of all of its citizens overseas
and cannot prevent those acts from being interpreted as
somehow official or sanctioned by the government. That ratio-
nale disappears, however, for demonstrations and other
speech clearly directed toward the United States or toward
United States representatives in the host nations. A general
discomfort with citizens being viewed in an unfavorable light
overseas should not be sufficient rationale to inhibit political
expression.
D. Basic Training
Identified in Greer v. Spock1 1 as a higher level of military
interest, restrictions on speech (mainly a result of restrictions
on movement and other rights) are justified for the limited
period of basic training. Still, when a trainee is properly on
his own time, the restrictions should vanish.
189. See supra notes 83 and 183 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
191. 424 U.S. 828, 848-49 (1976). Justice Brennan criticized such an exception. Id.
at 861 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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E. Political Activity
Most restrictions in this area should be eliminated, retain-
ing only the prohibition against running for political office
while on active duty, and the ban on activity that would make
subordinates feel pressured to vote a certain way (traditional
Hatch Act rationale) or that would identify someone as a
"military" candidate. Some limits should be retained because
of the historical rationale that mandates a government run by
civilians. Given America's history, however, it is unlikely that
the people would easily fall into the dangers of "Caesarism."
Quashing speech because of the potential of such political
identification stands as a greater danger than the possibility
that a man on a white horse could take the country by storm,
as feared by the Howe court.192 Political speech also has a
great historical base, and restrictions on activities such as
writing letters to the editor (signed without military identifi-
cation; otherwise the speech-in-uniform rationale applies),
speaking publicly while out of uniform, and displaying a
cartop sign should be eliminated. All restrictions on involve-
ment in debates on public issues should be eliminated, subject
only to the general restraints in the categories above.
Generally, then, if soldiers were treated like public em-
ployees in most circumstances, their free speech rights would
be brought into clearer focus. The law on public employees
provides a logical and balanced backdrop against which to an-
alyze military rights. First amendment freedoms must be ac-
corded to the military whenever possible because military per-
sonnel are citizens and it is the government's burden to justify
any restrictions on them."'3 It should not matter, despite Jus-
tice Harlan's argument in his O'Callahan dissent, whether a
soldier is a Dr. Jekyll on duty and a Mr. Hyde on leave 94 so
long as his activities as Mr. Hyde do not affect his perform-
ance and are not performed under such circumstances, such as
while in uniform, that make them military acts. A more liberal
192. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
193. In Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409,
55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966), the court held that a government that requires a waiver of
constitutional rights as a condition of public employment has the burden of showing
the practical necessity of such a limitation.
194. 395 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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rule also has great practical value.195
The military must have the confidence, consistent with the
country's heritage, to do as other countries have done and al-
low the soldier to be a full citizen."" It should heed the
Court's statement in United States v. Robel that national de-
fense is not an end in itself, but that the military must defend
all of America's unique freedoms. That Court said that it
would be "ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would
195. In Glines, the majority warned about quashing speech to the point of encour-
aging the "illusion" of unity. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 358 (1980). That view-
point is supported in Defense Department directives. In its Guidance on Dissent cir-
cular, the Department warned that "freedom of expression is a fundamental right,"
warning that "[s]evere disciplinary action in response to a relatively insignificant
manifestation of dissent can have a counter productive effect ... because the reac-
tion appears out of proportion to the threat."
Colonel Murphy warned that too much command domination of free speech could
"make a garrison state of our country." See Murphy, supra note 118, at 123. He said
a reasonable amount of freedom "is conducive to good morale. . . .[and] nourishes
• .. initiative and self-reliance" and keeps commanders from thinking they must
solve all of the problems of their subordinates. Id.
Lay military analysts also have argued that, regardless of the constitutional basis
for expanding the servicemember's freedom of speech, there are practical reasons to
do so. Vagts said:
[T]here are a number of practical adverse consequences that could arise from
... [speech] curbs.... [I]t seems dangerous to prevent accumulated military
discontent from being discharged through the virtually harmless channels of
griping to friends or writing letters to the editors ... or to families at
home .... A degree of freedom of expression may also encourage needed men
to remain in the service.
Vagts, supra note 75, at 190. Sherman was more pessimistic, but still emphasized the
practical:
A military isolated from political debate and the winds of change can become a
repressive force, out of touch with the values and ideals of the civilian society
.... [A] military which attempts to deny... servicemen the right to engage
in the political and social debates of the country is likely to encounter resis-
tance and dissent which can.., adversely affect their efficiency and the mili-
tary's ability to provide for the defense of our nation.
See Sherman, supra note 71, at 367.
196. The German Soldiers Act "guarantees the soldier's right to carry out political
activities during his free time." Krueger-Sprengel, The German Military Legal Sys-
tem, 57 ML. L. REv. 17, 21 (1972). In Germany, restraints are so lax that some
soldiers have been elected to the Bundestag (German parliament). Id. According to
Krueger-Sprengel, the liberal system "keeps the limitations of the rights of the indi-
vidual soldier to a minimum level." Id. at 26. Such a system does not necessarily
require elimination of rank (as in China) or unionization. France forbids soldiers "to
participate in political or union activity while on active duty," but, like Holland, has
faced the problem of combatting unionization of its armed forces. N.Y. Times, Nov.
11, 1975, at 15, col. 1.
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sanction the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which
makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile. '
LAWRENCE JUDE MORRIS
197. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).

